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Sales
By Keith A. Rowley, Robyn L. Meadows, Larry T Garvin, and Carolyn L. Dessin*
SCOPE OF ARTICLE 2
Article 2 applies to "transactions in goods"' and defines "goods" to include tan-
gible personal property that is movable at the time it is identified to the contract.2
Courts tend to read section 2-102 somewhat more narrowly than its text invites,
applying Article 2 only to present sales of goods and to contracts for the future
sale of goods.'
In Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. American Ash Recycling Corp.,' the court had to determine
whether a transfer of goods for which the transferee was not required to pay was
a contract for the sale of goods.' A general contractor, Lobar, subcontracted with
Pennsy to pave certain driveways and a parking lot. Lobar's specifications permitted
Pennsy to use a form of treated ash aggregate known as "AggRite" in lieu of tradi-
tional paving materials and were accompanied by a letter from American Ash of-
fering to supply AggRite at no cost on a first come, first served basis. American Ash
provided Pennsy some 11,000 tons of free AggRite, which Pennsy used to perform
the specified paving. Within two months, the pavement developed extensive crack-
ing. Pennsy removed and disposed of the AggRite and repaved with other materials.
In so doing, Pennsy incurred substantial expenses, in no small measure because
the Pennsylvania Department of the Environment classified AggRite as hazardous
* Keith A. Rowley is a Professor of Law at the William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Ne-
vada Las Vegas, the Charles E. Tweedy, Jr. Visiting Chairholder in Law for 2007-08 at the University
of Alabama School of Law, and co-chair of the Sale of Goods Subcommittee. Robyn L. Meadows is a
Professor of Law at Widener University School of Law in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania and an editor of the
Annual U.C.C. Survey Larry T. Garvin is a Professor of Law at the Moritz College of Law, The Ohio
State University Carolyn L. Dessin is an Associate Professor at the University of Akron School of Law.
1. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (2002). Neither Article 2 nor Article 1 defines "transaction." Citations to
U.C.C. Article 2 are to the version of Article 2 prior to the amendments promulgated in 2003.
2. See U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (2002).
3. While "transactions" appears to include more than just present and future sales, this approach
is not without support in Article 2. Section 2-106 begins, "In this Article unless the context otherwise
requires 'contract' and 'agreement' are limited to those relating to the present or future sale of goods."
U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (2002). Because most of the substantive provisions in Article 2 apply to contracts
or agreements, it is logical for courts to focus on contracts or agreements for the present or future sale
of goods.
4. 895 A.2d 595 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 907 A.2d 1103 (Pa. 2006).
5. See U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (2002) ("A 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer
for a price." (emphasis added)).
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waste material.6 The trial court dismissed Pennsys breach of warranty claims against
American Ash because Pennsy did not pay American Ash for the AggRite. The su-
perior court reversed, holding that the benefit to American Ash of Pennsy using
AggRite on the project and Pennsy's assumption of liability for any disposal costs
were consideration to support a contract between Pennsy and American Ash and, in
turn, payment of a price by means other than money, goods, or realty7
In Russo v. NCS Pearson, Inc.,' the plaintiffs were among nearly 500,000 high
school students who took the October 2005 Scholastic Aptitude Test ("SAT").
After initially reporting the test scores, the College Entrance Examination Board
("CEEB") discovered that NCS Pearson ("NCSP"), the company CEEB engaged
to score the tests, had misscored 4,724 tests: 4,111 examinees-including the
plaintiffs-received scores that were lower than they should have received, and
613 other examinees received scores that were higher than they should have re-
ceived. NCSP rescored the exams and CEEB reported the corrected higher scores
to the schools the 4,111 underscored examinees had designated, but did not re-
port the corrected lower scores to the schools the 613 overscored examinees had
designated. The plaintiffs sued CEEB and NCSP for, inter alia, breach of Article 2
warranties, arguing that not correcting the overscored examinees' SAT scores hurt
the plaintiffs' chances at gaining admission to and receiving financial aid from
the schools to which they applied.9 While the court could have found that the
contract between CEEB and the plaintiffs was not a sale of goods because CEEB
did not transfer title to the SAT exam book or the answer sheet to the plaintiffs,10
instead the court "[a]ssumed without deciding" that it was a "mixed" contract for
goods and services and found that CEEB's testing and score-reporting services
were the predominant purpose of the contract; therefore, no Article 2 warranties
arose from the contract."
Another noteworthy "mixed" contract case is Waterfront Properties, Inc. v. Xerox
Connect, Inc. 2 Waterfront agreed to purchase computer and network hardware
and customized software from Xerox. The contract price allocated $30,575 for
the hardware and $138,827 for the customized software. Waterfront timely paid
in full. Both at the time Xerox initially installed the hardware and customized
6. See Pennsy Supply, 895 A.2d at 598-99.
7. Id. at 603-04; see U.C.C. § 2-304(1) (2002) ("The price can be made payable in money or
otherwise." (emphasis added)).
8. 462 F Supp. 2d 981 (D. Minn. 2006).
9. See id. at 988-90.
10. See supra note 5.
11. See Russo, 462 F Supp. 2d at 997 ("In the same way that an artist cannot fill a canvas
without paint, [CEEB] cannot administer, score, and report SAT results without the test book-
let, answer sheet, and score report. Although the service provided by [CEEB] ultimately re-
sulted in a score printed on a piece of paper, that piece of paper is not the predominant factor;
it is the service provided by [CEEB] that predominates the transaction."); compare Wagner-
Meinert, Inc. v. EDA Controls Corp., 444 F Supp. 2d 800 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (applying Article 2
to a contract for the sale of a $13,000 ammonia detection system and $600 worth of on-site start-
up service), aff'd, No. 06-3777, 62 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 167 (6th Cir. Feb. 23, 2007).
12. No. Civ. 3:04CV322-H, 58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 809 (WD.N.C. Jan. 31, 2006).
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software and again several months after Waterfront made the final payment, Wa-
terfront complained that the customized software was "cumbersome." However,
at no time did Waterfront reject the software or request a price reduction or re-
fund. 3 When Waterfront sued Xerox more than four years later, alleging that the
customized software did not perform as warranted, Xerox moved for summary
judgment due to Waterfront's failure to timely give notice under U.C.C. § 2-607.
Waterfront did not contest that it failed to satisfy section 2-607; instead, it argued
that the contract was not predominantly for the sale of goods, therefore section
2-607 did not apply The court held that the customized software was a good and
granted Xerox's motion for summary judgment. 4
Article 2 does not govern all contracts that are exclusively or predominantly for
the present or future sale of goods for a price. If the seller and buyer have their
respective places of business in two different countries, each of which is a party to
the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods ("CISG"),
the CISG governs unless an exception applies." CISG Article 6 empowers par-
ties to agree contractually not to be bound by the CISG. 16 American courts have
consistently held that merely choosing the law of a state of the United States or of
another country that is a party to the CISG is insufficient to avoid the CISG be-
cause the CISG is part of the law of the chosen jurisdiction."7 Instead, to avoid ap-
plication of the CISG, the choice-of-law clause must expressly exclude the CISG.18
American Biophysics Corp. v. Dubois Marine Specialties'9 bucked that trend, holding
that a contractual term providing that the parties' agreement "shall be construed
and enforced in accordance with the laws of the state of Rhode Island" was "suffi-
cient to exclude application of the CISG."20 As one of us has concluded elsewhere
for reasons more fully explored therein, "American Biophysics is an outlier at best,
and wrongly decided at worst. "21
13. See id. at 810-11.
14. See id. at 814 (collecting cases); see also In re Mystic Tank Lines Corp., 354 B.R. 694, 700
(Bankr. D.N.J. 2006) (applying Article 2 to a contract for software). But cf. TK Power, Inc. v. Textron,
Inc., 433 E Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (bifurcating a contract for designing software and its
subsequent sale, applying common law to the former and Article 2 to the latter).
15. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF97/18 (1980) [hereinafter "CISG"]. Seegenerally Keith A. Rowley, The U.N. Conven-
tion on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, in HOWARD 0. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRAcTS
§§ 23:01-23:07 (rev. ed. 2007).
16. CISG art. 6 ("The parties may exclude the application of this Convention.
17. See, e.g., BP Oil Int'l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 E3d 333, 337 (5th
Cir. 2003); American Mint LLC v. GOSoftware, Inc., No. Civ. A. 1:05-CV-650, 2006 WL 42090, at
*3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2006); Ajax Tool Works, Inc. v. Can-Eng Mfg. Ltd., No. O1-C-5938, 2003 WL
223187, at *3 (N.D. II. Jan. 30, 2003); Asante Techs., Inc. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 E Supp. 2d 1142,
1150 (N.D. Cal. 2001). See generally Rowley, supra note 15, § 23:5.
18. See, e.g., Modius, Inc. v. PsiNaptic, Inc., No. C 06-02074 SI, 2006 WL 1156390, at * 5 (N.D.
Cal. May 2, 2006) ("The parties agree that the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the In-
ternational Sale of Goods is specifically excluded from application to this Agreement."). See generally
Rowley, supra note 15, § 23:5 n.5, at 23-21.
19. 411 E Supp. 2d 61 (D.R.I. 2006).
20. Id. at 63.
21. Rowley, supra note 15, § 23:5 n.4, at 23-21.
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CONTRACT FORMATION
Sections 2-204 through 2-207 govern contract formation under Article 2. While
much attention centers on 2-207, Kraft Foods North America, Inc. v. Banner Engi-
neering Sales, Inc.22 turned on the application of section 2-206. Banner submitted
a price quotation to Kraft for a pipe heating system to be installed in a Kraft plant
to test certain baked goods. After several e-mail exchanges and some changes to
the price quotation due to altered requirements, Kraft ordered the heating system
using its purchase order, which imposed substantially greater liability on Ban-
ner in the event of a defect in the system than did the terms and conditions in
Banner's price quotation. Problems with the system ultimately caused Kraft to
destroy almost 35,000 cases of cookies and shut the test line down for four or
five months. 23 Kraft sued to recover consequential damages attributable to, inter
alia, Banner's breach of warranty. Banner argued that its price quotation, which
disclaimed liability for consequential damages and limited all warranties to the
extent of the manufacturer's express warranty, constituted the offer, which Kraft
accepted by submitting its purchase order; therefore, Banner's terms and condi-
tions governed the contract.24 The court rejected this argument finding instead
that Kraft's purchase order was the offer, which Banner accepted by shipping the
goods.25 The court noted that, while price quotations are generally invitations to
offer because the recipient cannot simply accept the quote and create a binding
contract, whether a particular price quote is an offer is governed by the intent of
the party making it.2 6 While Banner's price quotation included "Terms and Condi-
tions" and indicated that Kraft could accept it within 30 days, it further provided
that all orders were subject to approval by Banner's home office. Kraft could not
accept the "offer" simply by submitting a purchase order; rather, the purchase
order was Kraft's offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment, which Ban-
ner accepted by shipping the goods; thus, the terms of Kraft's purchase order
governed the contract.27
In Robert Bosch Corp. v. ASC Inc.28 -a case hinging on section 2-207, rather
than section 2-206-the court held that a seller's price quotation was an offer,
which the buyer accepted by sending a purchase order for the quoted quantity
and price. But what of the terms? Employing three arguments based on sec-
tion 2-207, the buyer sought to avoid the application of an arbitration provision
contained in the seller's terms and conditions. First, the buyer argued that its
purchase order was the offer, which the seller accepted, and the seller's arbitration
22. 446 F Supp. 2d 551 (E.D. Va. 2006).
23. See id. at 567-68.
24. Id. at 568.
25. Id. at 569.
26. Id. at 568-69.
27. Id. at 569-70; see U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b) (2002). The court also noted that, even if the price quo-
tation was an offer, Kraft's purchase order expressly conditioned its acceptance on assent to its terms
under U.C.C. § 2-207, which would prevent the seller's terms from controlling the contract. Kraft
Foods, 446 F Supp. 2d at 569 n.15; see U.C.C. § 2-207 (2002) (discussed infra note 31).
28. 195 Fed. Appx. 503 (6th Cir. 2006).
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provision was not part of the contract because it materially altered the contract.2 9
The court held that the seller's quotation was the offer: not only did it contain the
price, quantity, and other essential terms, the buyer's purchase order specifically
referenced it.30 Second, the buyer argued that, if the seller's quotation was an of-
fer, the buyer's purchase order was expressly conditioned on the seller's assent to
the buyer's terms and, therefore, was not an acceptance of the seller's offer.31 The
court held that a conditional acceptance must reveal that the offeree would not
proceed unless the offeror assented to the additional or different terms in the con-
ditional acceptance. Because there was no language in the buyer's purchase order
that indicated it would not proceed without the seller's assent, the purchase order
operated as an acceptance.32 Finally, the buyer argued that even if its purchase
order accepted the seller's offer, the reservation of rights in the purchase order
conflicted with the seller's arbitration provision and therefore both terms were
knocked out of the contract. 33 The court found that the objective plain meaning
of the provision reserving all of the buyer's rights and remedies did not include
the right to resolve disputes in a judicial forum; therefore, it did not conflict with
the seller's arbitration term. Because the terms were not different, the knock out
rule did not apply and the arbitration term was part of the parties' contract."
In General Steel Corp. v. Collins,3 the offeree triggered a battle of the forms by
altering the written offer before signing and returning it to the offeror. The sell-
er's written offer included an arbitration clause and language providing that any
modification of or alteration to its terms would be void unless agreed to in a sepa-
rate writing signed by both parties. The buyer's agent marked out the arbitration
provision before signing and returning the seller's offer. After a dispute arose, the
buyer sued to recover its deposit and the seller sought to compel arbitration. The
seller argued that the buyer accepted the terms in the seller's offer even though
the buyer's acceptance contained a different term and, therefore, the arbitration
provision should be enforced.3 6 The trial court denied the seller's motion to compel
arbitration and the appellate court affirmed. While correctly noting that section
2-207 was intended to abrogate the common law mirror image rule and allow a
contract to be formed even though the terms in the parties' documents differ, the
29. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2002) (providing that, between merchants, an additional term in an ac-
ceptance becomes part of the contract unless the offeror limited acceptance to the terms of its offer, the
additional term materially alters the contract, or the offeror notifies the offeree that the offeror objects
to the additional term).
30. See Robert Bosch, 195 Fed. Appx. at 506.
31. See U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (2002). In that instance, the contract would be created by the parties'
performance and terms of the contract would be only those contained in both parties' writings plus
any terms implied by Article 2 needed to complete the contract. See U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (2002).
32. See Robert Bosch, 195 Fed. Appx. at 506.
33. The knock out rule provides that, when terms of an offer and acceptance conflict, the conflict-
ing terms knock each other out and any resulting gaps are filled by the Code. See, e.g., Dorton v. Col-
lins & Aikman Corp., 453 E2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972); Flender Corp. v. Tippins Int'l, Inc., 830 A.2d
1279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), appeal denied, 844 A.2d 553 (Pa. 2004).
34. See Robert Bosch, 195 Fed. Appx. at 507-08.
35. 196 S.W3d 18 (Ky Ct. App. 2006).
36. See id. at 19-20.
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appellate court did not clearly state whether the buyer's acceptance constituted a
definite and seasonable acceptance under section 2-207(1). The court did state,
"[a]s long as the parties demonstrate their mutual assent to the essential terms of
an agreement, a written contract is deemed to exist... [and] the contract is con-
strued to consist of the essential terms of the offer to which the offeree's response has
pledged its agreement. '37 While the court's statement that an acceptance operates
on only the essential terms of the offer is too broad, 38 the court apparently viewed
the buyer's act of signing the seller's form with the stricken arbitration clause as
an acceptance containing a different term. The court then joined the majority of
jurisdictions that apply the knock out rule to conflicting terms in the offer and
acceptance .31
CONTRACT MODIFICATION
Article 2 expressly recognizes both the enforceability of a contractual clause pro-
hibiting subsequent oral modification 4° and the possibility that the parties may
waive such a clause.41 In Royster-Clark, Inc. v. Olsen's Mill, Inc. ,42 the court held that
the parties to a fertilizer sales contract waived the no-oral-modification provision in
their written agreement and orally modified their contract. After the market price
of fertilizer fell dramatically, the buyer sought to buy out its obligation under the
sales contract, as many of the seller's customers had done. The seller orally offered
concessions on the price of the undelivered fertilizer if the buyer agreed to take all
of the seller's remaining fertilizer. The buyer orally agreed and took all of the fertil-
izer called for under its original contract, plus an additional 36.4 tons, all of which
the buyer sold at a loss. The seller, relying on the no-oral-modification provision,
refused to give the buyer the promised concessions and sued the buyer for the full
contract price. The buyer counterclaimed for a refund based on the seller's promised
price reduction. 43 The court upheld as not clearly erroneous the trial court's fac-
tual finding that the parties had orally modified their original contract,' and then
turned its attention to section 2-209. Section 2-209 requires that a modification
37. Id. at 21 (emphasis added). Nowhere does section 2-207 provide that a party accepts only
the "essential terms" of an offer. The court may be basing this statement on the principles reflected
in § 2-207(3) (discussed supra note 31), which recognizes a contract created by conduct when the
parties do not agree to a contract through their writings; however, that section is inapplicable when
the written acceptance is operative as an acceptance. See U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (2002).
38. A definite and seasonable acceptance that is not expressly conditioned on assent to its ad-
ditional or different terms operates as an acceptance of the offer, not merely as an acceptance of the
essential terms of the offer. See U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (2002). Based on this idea, a minority of courts has
held, and some commentators agree, that the terms of the offer control over conflicting terms in the
acceptance, because the offeree accepted the offer. See Flender Corp., 830 A.2d at 1285-86 (discussing,
but not adopting, this minority rule).
39. General Steel, 196 S.W3d at 21; see supra note 33.
40. U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (2002).
41. U.C.C. § 2-209(4) (2002).
42. 714 N.W2d 530 (Wis. 2006).
43. See id. at 532-33.
44. Id. at 534.
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of a contract for the sale of goods be in writing if either the parties' contract
so requires or the contract as modified is within the Article 2 statute of frauds.
4 5
The court held that the modified contract satisfied the Article 2 statute of frauds
because the seller had delivered and the buyer accepted the additional fertilizer.
46
As for the contractual prohibition on oral modification, the court reasoned that
there was sufficient evidence, based on the witnesses' testimony and parties' course
of dealings over 40 years, to support the trial court's finding that the parties had
waived the no-oral-modification provision.4"
OPEN PRICE TERM
Section 2-305 allows parties to contract before they have agreed upon a price. 48
If the agreement gives either party the right to fix the price, the party so autho-
rized must fix the price in good faith.49 In Autry Petroleum Co. v. BP Products North
America, Inc. ,50 the court ruled that, although there is no separate cause of action
for failing to act in good faith under the U.C.C.,51 allegations that the seller failed
to set the price of the goods sold in good faith stated a cognizable cause of action.
The buyers, jobbers who distributed BP's petroleum products to retail outlets,
alleged that BP promised a 1% discount on the price to the jobbers, and then in-
flated the price to recoup the discount. The court held that, if true, this would be




In Rite-Aid Corp. v. Levy-Gray,5 3 the question for the court was whether a
pharmacy made (and breached) an Article 2 express warranty when it gave a
customer, along with the prescription drug it sold her, a "Rite Advice" patient
package insert instructing her to "[take with food or milk if stomach upset oc-
curs unless your doctor directs otherwise." The customer took the first dose
with water, experienced an upset stomach, and then began taking the medicine
with milk. She also consumed other dairy products while taking the medicine.
Her symptoms only improved when she stopped taking the medicine with dairy
products, by which time she had developed a chronic autoimmune condition
caused or exacerbated by having consumed milk and other dairy products while
45. See U.C.C. §§ 2-209(2), (3) (2002).
46. Royster-Clark, 714 N.W2d at 540-41; see U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(c) (2002) (providing an exception
to the statute of frauds to the extent that the parties have performed).
47. See Royster-Clark, 714 N.W2d at 535-39.
48. U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (2002).
49. U.C.C. § 2-305(2) (2002).
50. No. 4:05-CV-113 (CDL), 59 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 468 (M.D. Ga. May 1, 2006).
51. See id. at 471; accord PEB Commentary No. 10 (Feb. 10, 1994).
52. See Autry Petroleum, 59 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 471-72.
53. 894 A.2d 563 (Md. 2006).
HeinOnline -- 62 Bus. Law. 1565 2006-2007
1566 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 62, August 2007
taking her medicine. 4 The buyer sued for breach of warranty and prevailed in
the trial and intermediate appellate courts. The Maryland Court of Appeals af-
firmed, finding that the above-quoted statement in the "Rite Advice" insert was
an affirmation of fact that formed part of the basis of the buyer's bargain with
Rite Aid under section 2-313.1' Moreover, the "learned intermediary doctrine"
did not shield Rite Aid from warranty liability based on its Rite Advice insert
because, while the buyer relied on her physician to prescribe the appropriate
medicine, she relied on Rite Aid's advice about the compatibility of the medicine
and dairy products.56
IMPLIED WARRANTIES
In several interesting cases, courts had to determine whether the seller had
breached an implied warranty. In Strauss v. Ford Motor Co.," the court held that
Jaguar automobiles sold without the hardware necessary to affix a state-required
front license plate did not violate the implied warranties of merchantability or fit-
ness for particular purpose because of the inconvenience to the buyer of having
to obtain hardware necessary to affix a front license plate.58 In Moss v. Batesville
Casket Co.," the court held that a casket with cracks and wood separation that
were discovered when the body was exhumed two and a half years after burial was
not unfit either for a particular purpose or its ordinary purpose because there was
no evidence that the casket did not adequately preserve the decedent's remains.
Although not accepting the seller's argument that the ordinary purpose of a casket
was only to protect the remains until interment, the court found the children of
the decedent presented no evidence that the remains were damaged in any way
from the cracks in the casket.
60
In Rudloff v. Wendy's Restaurant of Rochester Inc.,1 a customer allegedly broke
a tooth when biting into a Wendy's hamburger. Because the customer swallowed
the offending part of the hamburger, he could not prove whether the problem
with the hamburger was due to (1) a piece of bone, gristle, or other substance
natural to the meat; (2) a foreign object that was introduced into the meat dur-
ing processing; (3) some other problem with the hamburger patty, such as being
partially frozen; or (4) a problem with the bun, cheese, or condiments. 62 The
court nevertheless denied the restaurant's motion for summary judgment on the
customer's claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability. While ac-
knowledging that "you can't sue for finding a bone in your steak when you order
54. See id. at 566-67.
55. See id. at 572-73.
56. See id. at 577-79.
57. 439 F Supp. 2d 680 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
58. See id. at 686-87.
59. 935 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 2006).
60. Id. at 401-02.
61. 821 N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. City Ct. 2006).
62. See id. at 360.
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a T-bone steak,' 63 the court concluded that whether the unidentified object in the
hamburger that broke the customer's tooth could reasonably be expected to be in
a ground meat patty and whether the customer could be expected to take steps to
guard against the object were questions of fact for the jury. 4 In Yarrington v. Solvay
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ,65 the court held that lack of FDA approval did not make a
drug unfit for its intended purpose and could only be the basis of a breach of war-
ranty claim if the drug manufacturer had expressly warranted that the drug was
FDA-approved.66
PRIVITY OF CONTRACT
Most courts require privity of contract for a successful breach of implied war-
ranty claim. Applying this rule, two courts facing similar factual situations rejected
claims against an electric stun gun (Taser) manufacturer brought by survivors of
two persons who were killed when police used a Taser on them. Both courts ruled
that the survivors lacked privity of contract with the manufacturer and, therefore,
were precluded from bringing an action for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability under the U.C.C.67
In Cruickshank v. Clean Seas Co.,68 the court held that, while the Massachusetts
version of section 2-318 did not require privity of contract in consumer trans-




One of Karl Llewellyn's greatest complaints about sales law before the Code
was its inordinate emphasis on title, a concept he found arbitrary, simplistic, and
rigid.7" Not surprisingly, Article 2 stakes out a more Llewellian position: "This
Article deals with the issues between seller and buyer in terms of step by step
performance or non-performance under the contract for sale and not in terms of
whether or not 'title' to the goods has passed."'" Llewellyn cut title to its irreduc-
ible minimum. Still, it lingers.
63. Id. at 365.
64. See id. at 365-69.
65. No. A05-2288, 60 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1090 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2006).
66. See id. at 1093-94.
67. Neal-Lomax v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dept., No. 2:05CV1464 PMPPAC, 60 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
2d (West) 361 (D. Nev. July 18, 2006) (finding the decedent was neither an intended beneficiary of
the police-Taser contract nor a guest of the police under U.C.C. § 2-318); Sanders v. City of Fresno,
No. Civ. A. 05-0469 AWISMS, 59 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1209 (E.D. Cal. July 7,2006) (dismiss-
ing breach of warranty claim because California law required privity of contract in breach of warranty
action).
68. 346 B.R. 571 (D. Mass. 2006).
69. Id. at 579-80.
70. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 159,
169 (1938) ("[Title] remains, in the Sales field, an alien lump, undigested. It even interferes with the
digestive process.").
71. U.C.C. § 2-401 cmt. 1 (2002).
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Deerfield Manufacturing, Inc. v. JEM Investment Properties, LLC,72 concerned
a dispute over the ownership of two presses. Nova, a dealer in used industrial
equipment, bought a manufacturing plant containing a good deal of heavy ma-
chinery. Shortly thereafter, Nova began negotiating to sell the plant and most of
its contents to JEM. JEM balked at acquiring the two presses at issue because it
thought them overpriced. On December 5, 2003, Nova and JEM signed a contract
for the plant and its contents, excluding the presses. The contract provided that
Nova had to remove the presses within ninety days of closing or title to them
would pass toJEM. The sale closed on February 4, 2004. Meanwhile, on Novem-
ber 18, 2003, Nova contracted to sell the presses to Deerfield, which paid in full
the next day Deerfield's purchase order read "FOB truck loaded" with a delivery
date of "mid to late December." Nova's invoice stated that Nova "will dismantle
and load presses on trucks provided by Deerfield. Preferred loading date is mid to
late December, 2003." Deerfield subsequently asked that delivery be delayed, as it
did not yet need the presses. Nova's owner had not told the salesperson about the
deadline in the JEM contract, and Deerfield and Nova did not act until September
2004, by which time JEM had repaired the presses and started using them. JEM
refused to surrender the presses to Deerfield.73 Deerfield sued Nova for breach of
contract and JEM for delivery of the presses or damages for nondelivery, while
JEM countersued Nova for breach on the grounds that it had failed to disclose to
JEM that it had sold the presses to Deerfield.
Both Deerfield and JEM sought partial summary judgment on which held title
to the presses. Deerfield argued that the presses were to be delivered without
moving the goods, bringing them within section 2-401(3); therefore, Nova had
no title to transfer to JEM in December of 2003, not even voidable title, so JEM
could acquire no title under section 2-403(1). In contrast, JEM argued that section
2-401(2) applied because the goods had to be moved in order for performance
to be complete. As the presses had not been loaded when Nova sold the plant to
JEM, Nova held voidable title, and thus could transfer clear title to a good faith
purchaser for value.74 In its summary judgment opinion, the trial court concluded
that section 2-401(2)(a) applied, that Nova held voidable title, and that JEM gave
Nova value by paying $475,000 payment for machinery; however, the court left
open for trial the question of whether JEM was a good faith purchaser for value to
which Nova could pass clean title. 75 Following a five-day bench trial, the court
held that JEM was not a good faith purchaser because it knew at the time its pur-
chase closed in February 2004-and, in any event, before title would have vested
72. No. 04-73934, 2006 WL 2711811 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 21, 2006); see also Deerfield Mfg., Inc.
v. JEM Invest. Props., No. 04-73934, 58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 34 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 11, 2005)
(opinion on cross-motions for summary judgment).
73. See 2006 WL 2711811, at *3-5.
74. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (2002).
75. See Deerfield Mfg., 58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 41-45.
Citing to a leading Massachusetts case, Mechanics Nat'l Bank of Worcester v. Gaucher, 386 N.E.2d
1052 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979), the Deerfield Manufacturing court distinguished goods that the buyer
could readily pick up from those that required special handling. As the presses could be removed
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in it in May 2004-that Nova had sold the presses to a third party As a result,
JEM did not take title to the presses, and Deerfield had the right to demand them
in September 2004.76
CONTRACT PERFORMANCE
A buyer to whom a seller tenders or delivers nonconforming goods may, after
a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods, accept or reject them.77 Once a
buyer has accepted nonconforming goods, the buyer may revoke its acceptance if
the nonconformity substantially impairs the value of the goods to the buyer and
the buyer accepted the goods either on the reasonable belief that the seller would
cure the nonconformity or without discovering the nonconformity because of the
difficulty in doing so.78
In Waddell v. L.VR.V Inc. ,7 the Waddells purchased and took delivery of a 1996
motor home on September 1, 1997. Shortly thereafter, the Waddells experienced
only by crane through the building's roof, they could not be delivered merely by designating them
thus. The court also counted Deerfield's delay as making this something other than a routine and brief
bailment until pickup. In addition, the court pointed to the "EO.B. truck loaded" term in the contract,
which requires that the seller load the goods on board. U.C.C. § 2-319(1)(c) (2002). Nova's invoice
also required that it "dismantle and load the presses." As a result, the court found U.C.C. § 2-401(2)
applicable rather than § 2-401(3)(b), so Deerfield had not taken title to the presses; if Deerfield held
no title, then Nova's control could not have been a bailment. Deerfield Mfg., 58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(West) at 41-43.
The rest of the issues followed naturally Deerfield insisted that Nova held no title of any kind, but, as
the court pointed out, "[tlitle must be held by someone." Deerfield Mfg., 58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West)
at 43. If neither Deerfield nor JEM held title, then Nova must have held at least voidable title. If Nova
held voidable title, then it could pass clear title to JEM ifJEM was a good faith purchaser for value. The
court concluded that JEM did provide value in its $475,000 payment for machinery. Though Deerfield
argued that JEM excluded the presses in its purchase agreement, the court concluded that value could
rest in JEM's failure to collect rent for the ninety days after the closing. Id. at 44.
The court's conclusion is unexceptionable, but the reasoning leaves something to be desired. It would
have been sufficient to rest the decision on the shipping term and invoice, which clearly enough con-
templated further action by the seller before delivery would be complete. See, e.g., Crocker Nat'l Bank
v. Ideco Div. of Dresser Indus., Inc. 839 F2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988). The court's discussion of the dif-
ficulty of removal obscures the result. Certainly this line has no statutory basis; indeed, the comment
itself refers only to "the time when the seller has finally committed himself in regard to specific goods."
U.C.C. § 2-401 cmt. 4 (2002). The seller, not the buyer; the comment makes no reference to the buyer's
actions, aided or unaided, quick or slow. Nor is it obvious how size matters. Both the Mechanics National
Bank decision, which the court cited to approvingly, and the decision in Integrity Insurance Co. v. Marine
Midland Bank-Western, 396 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977), which it distinguished, involved the
sale of mobile homes, for example. Nor do the cases uniformly draw this distinction. See, e.g., Supe-
rior Derrick Servs., Inc. v. Anderson, 831 S.W2d 868 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that delivery of a
210,000-pound mast occurred at the seller's place of business). Indeed, one court that adhered to the
distinction also held that "had buyer fully paid for the goods and merely entrusted them in the care of
the seller, the result would be different." Phoenix Steel Corp. v. Rittenhouse Org. (In re Phoenix Steel
Corp.), 76 B.R. 373, 375 (Bankr. D. Del. 1987). Those are precisely our facts.
In an area, like this, normally answered by the contract the parties have made, there is much to be
said for an unambiguous, even mechanical, default rule. The statute is clear enough about the passage
of title whether the goods are or are not to be delivered physically; only uncertainty can arise from
obliging a court to determine how much huffing and puffing it will take to move the goods.
76. See 2006 WL 2711811, at *7.
77. U.C.C. §§ 2-513, 2-601, 2-602, 2-606 (2002).
78. U.C.C. § 2-608(1) (2002).
79. 125 P3d 1160 (Nev. 2006).
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engine problems. Despite repeated attempts over 18 months, the seller was unable
to solve the problems: the motor home continued to experience engine overheating
and numerous problems with its air conditioning, heating, and electrical systems.
The Waddells sued, inter alia, to revoke their acceptance of the motor home and to
recover all out-of-pocket expenses they incurred due to the motor home's chronic
problems, including their attorneys' fees. Following a bench trial, the trial court
found that the chronic problems substantially impaired the motor home's value
to the Waddells, entitling them to revoke their acceptance, and awarded the Wad-
dells their out-of-pocket expenditures, as well as attorneys' fees in the amount of
$15,000.0 The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court explained that sub-
stantial impairment requires finding that (1) the nonconformity impaired the value
of the good to the buyer and (2) a reasonable person in the buyer's position would
consider the extent of the impairment sufficient to deprive the buyer of the benefit
of her purchase.8' Here, there was ample testimony that the motor home's engine,
heating, cooling, and electrical problems impaired its value to the Waddells, who
intended to use the motor home as their primary residence and drive it around the
country for two or three years. Moreover, the motor home spent a total of seven of
the first 18 months the Waddells owned it at the seller's service department, during
which time the Waddells could not use the motor home for its intended purpose.
Finally, the court held that the Waddells did not fail to timely revoke their accep-
tance, despite having taken delivery of the motor home some 18 months before
revoking their acceptance.
8 2
RAD Concepts, Inc. v. Wilks Precision Instrument Co.83 involved acceptance, rejec-
tion, revocation of acceptance, and the right of a party who is reasonably insecure
about the other party's ability or willingness to perform to demand adequate as-
surance of performance and to suspend its own performance until it receives such
assurance. 84 WPIC agreed to fabricate steel molds for certain components and to
produce, according to RAD's specifications, and sell to RAD x-ray cassette hold-
ers incorporating those components. Due to problems with the initial samples,
the parties ultimately agreed to two separate contracts: one for 242 holders using
small screws; and another for 5,000 units using larger screws. RAD picked up the
242 small-screw holders without inspecting them, sold 76 of them, but failed to
pay the bulk of the invoice price, claiming that the holders were nonconform-
ing. WPIC sued for the unpaid balance. The trial court concluded that RAD had
accepted the 242 small-screw units by failing to timely reject after having had a
reasonable opportunity to reject and by selling 76 of the small-screw units to third
parties-an act inconsistent with WPIC's continued ownership of the goods.8
80. See id. at 1162.
81. See id. at 1163 (quotingJorgensen v. Pressnall, 545 P2d 1382 (Or. 1976)).
82. See id. at 1165 ("Because Wheeler's was unable to repair the defects after a total of seven months,
the Waddells were entitled to say "that's all" and revoke their acceptance, notwithstanding Wheeler's
good-faith attempts to repair the RV. Also, the reasonable time for revocation was tolled during the
seven months that Wheeler's kept the RV and attempted to repair the defects." (footnote omitted)).
83. 891 A.2d 1148 (Md. 2006).
84. See U.C.C. § 2-609(1) (2002).
85. See RAD Concepts, 891 A.2d at 1158-59 (citing U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(b), (c)).
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Moreover, because RAD failed to show that the holders were so defective as to
substantially impair their value, RAD had not properly revoked its acceptance of
the 242 small-screw units.8 6 Therefore, RAD was liable to WPIC for the balance
due on the small-screw invoice.
8 7
As for the contract for 5,000 large-screw units, the trial court found, inter alia,
that RAD's failure to pay the balance due on the first invoice gave WPIC reason-
able grounds to be insecure about whether RAD would pay for the 5,000-unit
order, entitling WPIC to seek adequate assurances from RAD and to suspend its
own performance pending RAD's assurances of performance. 88 It also held that
RAD's failure to provide WPIC the assurances the latter sought and statements by
RAD's authorized agent that RAD would not purchase the 5,000 large-screw units
constituted an anticipatory repudiation that substantially impaired the value of
the contract to WPIC and relieved WPIC of any obligation to further perform.89
The appellate court affirmed each of these rulings and added that, contrary to
RAD's argument on appeal, RAD failed to timely retract its repudiation because
WPIC had materially changed its position in reliance on RAD's repudiation prior
to the attempted retraction and RAD's untimely attempt to retract was not accom-
panied by the adequate assurances to which WPIC was entitled.90
OFFSET/RECOUPMENT
Section 2-717 authorizes a buyer, upon notice to the seller, to deduct any dam-
ages due from the seller for its breach of a contract from any amount the buyer
owes the seller under the same contract.9' The major limitation on this right is that
the offsetting claims must arise under the same contract.
In ITV Direct, Inc. v. Healthy Solutions, LLC,92 the parties entered into a distribution
agreement requiring Healthy Solutions to assist ITV with marketing a food supple-
ment that ITV would purchase from Healthy Solutions for resale. ITV purchased
a quantity of the product from Healthy Solutions for which IIV did not pay after
learning that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion were investigating the claims Healthy Solutions was making about the product.
ITV eventually sued Healthy Solutions for breaching the distribution agreement and
Healthy Solutions sued ITV for the unpaid invoices. ITV sought to set off any un-
paid amounts it owed Healthy Solutions against the unliquidated damages it claimed
Healthy Solutions owed it for breaching the distribution agreement. The court de-
nied ITV's setoff claim, concluding that the distribution agreement and the purchase
orders were not the "same contract" for purposes of section 2-717.93 Likewise, in
86. See id. at 1160 (citing U.C.C. § 2-608).
87. See id.
88. See id. at 1162-63 (citing U.C.C. § 2-609 & cmt. 3).
89. See id. (citing U.C.C. 66 2-609(4) & 2-610).
90. See id. at 1167-71 (citing U.C.C. § 2-611).
91. U.C.C. § 2-717 (2002).
92. 445 E3d 66 (1st Cir. 2006).
93. See id. at 71-72.
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AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc., the court held that a buyer of multiple
products could not withhold payments due for non-defective product lines because
it alleged the seller breached with respect to one or more defective product lines. 4
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Section 2-725 imposes a four-year statute of limitations on claims governed by
Article 2, unless the parties agree to a shorter period of not less than one year.95
In Daley v. Twin Disc, Inc. ,96 the court made clear that unsuccessful attempts to
repair goods during the statutory or contractual limitations period will not, with-
out more, extend the limitations period or toll limitations during the attempted
repairs-although "purposely prolonging the time for repairs beyond the statute
of limitations" might do so."
Accrual of a claim for breach is not subject to a discovery rule; however, if a
warranty expressly extends to future performance, a cause of action for breach
of warranty will not accrue until the breach is or should have been discovered."
Thus, in Busche v. Monaco Coach Corp., the court held that limitations did not
begin to run on a claim based on a five-year/50,000-mile express warranty on a
motor home until the buyer discovered or should have discovered the breach of
warranty 99 Similarly, in Carlisle Corp. v. Medical City Dallas, Ltd.,100 an express war-
ranty that a roofing membrane would not "prematurely deteriorate to the point
of failure due to weathering for a period of twenty (20) years from the date of
sale" started the statutory four-year limitations clock "not upon initial delivery,
94. 465 E3d 946, 950 (9th Cir. 2006). The court also held that section 2-717 preempted any equi-
table offset or recoupment claim AmerisourceBergen might assert. See id. at 951.
95. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (2002).
96. 440 E Supp. 2d 48 (D. Mass. 2006).
97. See id. at 52. This seems counterintuitive, given the number of courts that have tolled the period
within which a buyer must timely revoke acceptance of nonconforming goods to allow good faith
efforts to resolve the nonconformity. See, e.g., Waddell v. L.V.R.V Inc., 125 P3d 1160 (Nev. 2006) (dis-
cussed supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text); North Am. Lighting, Inc. v. Hopkins Mfg. Corp.,
37 E3d 1253 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Illinois law). The best explanation is that section 2-725(1) is
more a statute of repose, setting an absolute outer limit on the time within which sellers are subject to
suit. Notice that section 2-725(1) allows parties to shorten the time within which to bring suit, but not
to lengthen it. See Central Washington Refrigeration, Inc. v. Barbee, 946 P2d 760, 767 (Wash. 1997)
(Guy, J., dissenting) ("A statute of limitation bars plaintiffs from bringing an already accrued claim after
a specified period of time; a statute of repose terminates a right of action after a specified time, even
if the injury has not yet occurred. The language of U.C.C. § 2-725 unambiguously creates a statute of
repose .... [A]11 claims must be made no more than four years after delivery, whether or not the buyer
is aware of the product's defect.").
98. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (2002); see Rembrandt Constr., Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., No. 270577, 61
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 409, 410-11 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2006) ("The imposition of a dis-
covery rule by the trial court for accrual of plaintiffs claim is directly contrary to both the clear and
unambiguous language of the applicable statute and case law. Without a warranty extending to the
future performance of the subject goods, a cause of action ... accruels] upon tender of delivery").
99. No. Civ. A. 06-3801, 2006 WL 3302477, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2006) ("[Pllaintiffs would
have no legal remedy if the cause of action accrued on the date the motor home was tendered and
the warranty was breached during the fifth year. Such a result would be illogical and undermine the
protection under the warranty.").
100. 196 S.W3d 855 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).
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but when a reasonable buyer should have discovered... premature deterioration
to the point of failure because of weathering."'10' The buyer's warranty claim was
not time-barred as a matter of law because the buyer filed suit more than ten
years after a contractor installed the seller's membrane; nor was the buyer's claim
time-barred as a matter of fact, despite persistent roof leakage as much as six years
before the buyer filed suit, because roof leakage could have been caused by faulty
workmanship installing the membrane, by premature deterioration of the mem-
brane itself, or both, and the court found sufficient evidence to support the jury's
finding that only months before the buyer filed suit did it have actual or construc-
tive knowledge that the leakage was due to membrane failure.
10 2
ECONOMIC Loss RULE
The economic loss rule, which is most often pled as a defense to a tort claim,
typically operates to bar tort actions in cases based on a contractual relationship
unless there is personal injury or damage to property other than the property that
is the subject of the contract. 0 3 A number of states recognize a fraud exception
to the economic loss rule. 04 In KD & KD Enterprises, LLC v. Touch Automation,
LLC,10 5 the buyer purchased a DVD vending machine system, which the seller
represented as "not a prototype," "no longer in the testing stage of development,"
and suited to "enable plaintiff to operate an automated retail DVD store in very
little space with very low operating costs." When the system failed to function as
represented, the buyer sued for breach of contract and fraud. The court held that
the economic loss rule did not bar the buyer's fraud claim because to hold other-
wise would undermine the risk allocating purpose of the economic loss rule."0 6
101. Id. at 862.
102. See id. at 859-60, 862-64.
103. See, e.g., Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324, 327 (Ill. 1982); Suffolk County v. Long
Island Lighting Co., 728 E2d 52 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying New York law).
104. See, e.g., Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 699 N.W2d 205, 219-20 (Wis. 2005); Citi-
zens Ins. Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 585 N.W2d 314, 317 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998), appeal
denied, 602 N.W2d 578 (Mich. 1999).
105. No. CV-06-2083-PHX-FJM, 2006 WL 3808257 (D. Ariz. Dec. 27, 2006).
106. Id. at *2-3.
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